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HE North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFFA) was signed
into law by President Bill Clinton on December 8, 1993.1 But
NAFTA was not the only agreement being negotiated during that
time. President Clinton emphasized the need for additional negotiations
and provisions regarding environmental and labor issues that could sup-
plement the free trade provisions in NAFTA.2 The initial objectives of
these side agreements were to create environmental protection commis-
sions to improve pollution and enforcement mechanisms between the
countries and labor commissions to ensure workers were being treated
fairly and participating in safe work environments. 3 The side agreements
were negotiated on a "parallel track" to NAFTA 4 and were the key to
winning the Senate's approval and support of NAFTA.5
In December 1993, negotiations were complete and the North Ameri-
can Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North
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1. Dec 8, 1993: NAFTA signed into law, HistoRY, http://www.history.com/this-day-
in-history/nafta-signed-into-law (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
2. Jacqueline McFadyen, NAFTA Supplemental Agreements: Four Year Review, P-
TERSON INST. lOR INT'L ECON., available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/
print.cfm?Researchld=145&doc=pub ("Three agreements were concluded in Au-
gust 1993").
3. Id.
4. Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 ThMIP.
INTr'L & COMP. L.J. 257, 259 (1994), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/up
IoadedFiles/WilmerH ale_SharedContent/Files/Editorial/Publication/charnovitz
naftaenvironment.pdf.
5. Alex Zaretsky, The Existing Labor and Environmental Agreements in NAFTA,
Iii. Bus. J. (2008), available at http://www.law.illinois.edu/bljournal/post2008/03/
21 /The-Existing-Labor-and-Environmental-Agreements-in-NAFFA.aspx.
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American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) were signed into
effect. 6 The two side agreements are legally separate from NAFTA, but
were signed within one year of each other as part of the "parallel track"
duo.7 Since their implementation, both agreements have been applauded
and duplicated in numerous free trade agreements with other countries.8
But they have also faced harsh criticism from legal scholars who argue
that these agreements simply did not add any value to the enforcement
and legislative mechanisms that were already in place prior to their
implementation. 9
This report will analyze the provisions of both the NAAEC and
NAALC, comparing their similarities and differences. It will conclude
that although both agreements' enforcement mechanisms are fairly weak
and susceptible to the power struggle between companies and govern-
ment, their provisions are important in serving as the model for the many
free trade agreements the United States has since entered into.10 There-
fore, regardless of their complete effectiveness, they continue to serve an
important role in the realm of treaty-making and will be deemed a
success.
II. THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (NAAEC)
A. RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND OBJECTIVES
The NAAEC created an "intergovernmental organization-the Com-
mission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)-to support cooperation
among the NAFIA partners to address environmental issues of continen-
tal concern, including the environmental challenges and opportunities
presented by continent-wide free trade."" Through the CEC, the gov-
ernments of the United States, Mexico, and Canada work together to
protect ecosystems and communities, reduce pollution, address climate
change issues, and strengthen environmental law enforcement. 12 Each
country has the legal obligation to each other to enforce their own inter-
nal environmental laws. The NAAEC specifically requires that each
country commit and "ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high
levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve
those laws and regulations."' 13
6. McFayden, supra note 2.
7. Charnovitz, supra note 4.
8. See Michael O'Donovan, Labor Provisions from NAFTA to CAFTA: Standards
that Work, or a Work in Progress (Law & Justice in the Americas Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. LJA 2005-1, 2006), available at http://lawdigitalcom
mons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=-1001 &context=Ijawps.
9. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, supra note 4.
10. See id.
11. About the CEC, COMM'N FOR ENVT1. COOPEI'ATION, http://www.cec.org/
Page.asp?PagelD=1226&SiteNodelD=310 (last visited April 5, 2015).
12. Id.
13. Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 260-61.
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B. THE CHALLENGE FACING MEXICO AND ITS UNDERDEVELOPED
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION CASE LAW
One particular challenge faced by the implementation of the CEC was
the lack of pre-existing case law interpreting Mexico's environmental leg-
islation.14 The United States and Canada had environmental legislation
and precedent existing for decades prior to NAFTA, but Mexico's law
was far behind those countries' governments. 15 Because every legislative
change and decision made by the CEC would provide a new basis for
judicial decisions and opinions, the CEC created a training program to
ensure the Mexican judiciary interpreted legislation correctly in accor-
dance with U.S. and Canadian precedents. 16
C. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
As is the case with NAFTA, the NAAEC's dispute resolution proce-
dures have caused great concern for governments because the enforce-
ment mechanisms prove most beneficial for challenging private parties.17
The procedural aspects of CEC allow for third parties, both companies
and citizens, to file claims that allege violations of environmental laws in
the United States, Canada, and Mexico.1 8 This process begins with a
third-party claim, which then invokes the CEC's procedural steps.19 In
addition to third-party claims, the NAAEC also authorizes each of the
three countries to report environmental law violations against each
other. 20
In the case that a valid complaint is filed, the CEC can decide to con-
vene an arbitral panel for its investigation.21 In order for a complaint to
be valid, it may only allege non-enforcement of an environmental law
regarding products traded between the United States, Canada, and Mex-
ico or made by export-competing industries. 22 The complaining party has
the burden to show environmental injury to its country, or in the case of a
private party-itself.23
In order for a complaining party to prevail, it must prove to the CEC's
panel that there has been a "persistent pattern of failure by that other
14. See Pardee Ctr, Tim FUTFURE OF NoRTII AMERICAN TRADE PoIicy: LESSONS
FROM NAFTA (Kevin P. Gallagher et al. eds. 2009), 47-48 , available at http://
www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2009/11/Pardee-Report-NAFTA.pdf [hereinafter
Gallagher].
15. See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 4, at 278.
16. Id.
17. See Gallagher, supra note 14, at 44.
18. Id. at 62.
19. Id.
20. Charnovitz, supra note 4, at 261.
21. ld. at 266-67.
22. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Article 22, COMM'N
I-OR ENVTI. COOPERATION (CEC), available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?
PagelD=122&ContentlD=2734 (last visited May 8, 2015).
23. Charnovitz, supra note 4, at 110.
2015]
188 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 21
[p]arty to effectively enforce its environmental law."'24 A persistent pat-
tern of conduct has been defined as a "sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction."' 25 Therefore, one country's single failure to enforce a
particular environmental law will likely not be sufficient to be held liable
by the CEC.
The dispute regarding the CEC's true effectiveness arises after the de-
cision has been made. The dispute rests on the premise that its enforce-
ment and punishment capabilities are insufficient to warrant a severe
enough penalty.26 In addition, these procedures have been shown to be
so untimely as to prove almost moot.27 If the CEC finds a party guilty of
a "persistent pattern" of conduct, it may propose an action plan and the
parties will then have to agree on its implementation. 28 But in the case of
negotiations between a private party and a country's government, the pri-
vate party seems to hold the power-a fact troublesome to many. Legal
scholars argue that the enforcement organization of the CEC is institu-
tionally weak.29 The CEC lacks the means to actually ensure adherence
to the policies it is tasked with upholding. In addition, there is not
enough protection from legislation to counter-balance the increased
stress of higher levels of trade resulting from NAFTA-a problem many
predicted two decades ago. Most importantly, it is very easy for firms to
challenge environmental policies if they can be construed to be barriers
of trade. Therefore, it is easier to dodge environmental legislation for
private firms, and governments can have little to no control over their
own environmental legislation.
The most recognized case resulting in this exact predicament was Ethyl
Corp. v. Canada, which resulted in the Canadian Parliament repealing an
environmental law and issuing Ethyl Corporation a damages award in
excess of nineteen million dollars. 30 In Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, the Cana-
dian Parliament banned the import and transport of an Ethyl product
called MMT, citing it to be a "dangerous toxin" and a "significant public
health risk."'31 Ethyl Corporation filed a lawsuit under NAFTA's Chap-
ter Eleven provisions, which require governments to compensate inves-
tors when their goods are "expropriated" or when their actions are
"tantamount to expropriation. '32 Chapter Eleven of NAFTA allowed
this lawsuit because it gives standing to a private corporation to sue a
24. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Article 22, supra note
22.
25. Charnovitz, supra note 4, at 110.
26. Id. at 269.
27. Id. at 270.
28. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Article 23, CEC, http://
www.cec.org[Page.asp?Pagel D=122&ContentlD=2734 (last visited May 8, 2015).
29. Charnovitz, supra note 4, at 229.
30. Julie A. Soloway, Environmental Trade Barriers Under NAFTA: The MMT Fuel
Additives Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GI-03AL TRADE 55, 55 (1999).
31. See Michelle Sforza and Mark Vallianatos, Chemical Firm Uses Trade Pact to Con-
test Environmental Law, GLOBAL Po'y F. (Apr. 1997), available at https://
www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/212/45381 .html.
32. Id.
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government directly, similar to the complaint filing procedures used by
the CEC.33
After negotiations, Canada agreed to rescind the MMT ban, pay Ethyl
Corporation in excess of nineteen million dollars, and even issue a state-
ment that MMT was not an environmental or health risk to its Canadian
citizens.34 At the time of its resolution and even today, this case was very
important because it expanded Chapter Eleven of NAFI'A, which was
previously understood to only apply to investments. The decision ex-
panded Chapter Eleven's scope to allow private companies great power
in restricting legitimate health and safety laws inadvertently related to
trade.
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR
COOPERATION (NAALC)
A. RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND OBJECTIVES
NAFTA and its accompanying NAALC were the first agreements to
ever include worker rights provisions.35 Similar to the NAAEC, the
NAALC provides for each country's enforcement of its own labor laws
and standards, while also holding each country accountable to one an-
other.36 The NAALC does not force any of the countries to adopt new
labor laws or conform to each other's work standards-it only requires
each country to enforce what is already existing in each country with re-
gards to their labor laws. 37
B. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
Similar to the NAAEC and Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, claims alleging
a violation of a country's labor standards are heard in a dispute resolution
process that involves consultation, evaluation, and arbitration.38 The
standard for the finding of a violation under the NAALC are "patterns of
practice" by a party in the enforcement of its occupational safety and
health or other technical labor standards-a standard very close to the
one required under the NAAEC. 39
But unlike the NAAEC, the NAALC limits those claims that can be
brought to challenge and removes "freedom of association, collective bar-
gaining, and the right to strike" from its control.4 0 In addition, a claim
33. See Soloway, supra note 30, at 85-86.
34. Gus Van Harten, Reforming the NAFTA Investment Regime, 3 (All Papers Os-
goode Digital Commons, Working Paper No. 32, 2009).
35. MARY JAN BOLLF, NAFTA LABOR SIDEI_ AGREMENT: LE, SSONS FOR TI-IE
WORKER RiGHrs AN FAST-TRACK DFIATE 1 (2001), available at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/621 1.pdf.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id.
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cannot be brought if the labor law allegedly violated is not "covered by
mutually recognized labor laws," which requires that each country have
laws that address the "same general subject matter in a manner that pro-
vides enforceable rights, protections or standards."
4 1
The problem arises when one country alleges a violation against an-
other, believing its labor laws to be the same without understanding their
difference. For example, the Mexican government asserted that its em-
ployment discrimination laws against sex and pregnancy cover only those
workers who are already employed. 42 This is in direct contrast to the
similar United States discrimination laws, which prohibit discrimination
throughout all facets of the employment spectrum-hiring, firing, and
even mid-employment areas, such as promotion.43 Therefore, the United
States would likely not have a claim against Mexico within this realm of
law because the two countries do not have a "mutually recognized labor
standard. " 44
IV. THE EFFECT OF NAFTA'S TWO SIDE
AGREEMENTS-LOOKING AT THE PAST AND
TOWARDS THE FUTURE
A. THE COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE NAAEC AND THE NAALC
The NAALC and NAAEC are similar in many ways, from the "con-
cerns that led to their creation to the criticisms leveled against them."1
45
When NAFTA was first negotiated, many scholars criticized its lack of
labor and environmental provisions that it addressed. 46 One concern was
that a conflict might arise regarding the interplay between domestic laws
restricting trade for environmental or labor purposes and NAFTA, which
provided for free trade.47
Both agreements require commitment from all parties to "'effectively
enforce' their domestic environmental or labor laws" and attempt to
avoid the chance that each country may lower its overall standards to
ensure easy compliance with this provision. 48 But the problems associ-
ated with these two side agreements show that it might not come down to
governmental compliance at all. As proven by Ethyl Corp. v. Canada,
private investors and companies are able to implement NAFTA's Chap-
ter Eleven provisions to side-step any environmental regulation of the






45. John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor and
the Environment, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. Riw. 359, 359 (2004).
46. See id. at 363.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 365.
49. See generally Soloway, supra note 30.
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Therefore, it is a very low threshold for corporations to show injury to
their transport and sale of goods, and can prove to be a power struggle
among parties and governments hoping to keep their citizens safe
through environmental and labor regulations.
B. DESPITE THE CRITICISM, THEY BOTH SERVE AS THE MODEL
ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR STANDARDS FOR MANY FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS
Despite the criticisms, it is clear that the United States, Canadian, and
Mexican governments are better off with these provisions than without.
If NAFTA failed to address labor and environmental regulations, it
would have greatly compromised the safety of local workers and the com-
munities in which they live. In addition, these two agreements have
proved to be a successful model for future free trade agreements and that
fact, in itself, shows that the NAAEC and NAALC are worth it.
Since their implementation in 1994, the NAALC and the NAAEC have
been copied and implemented into many other free trade agreements in-
volving the United States; these include agreements with Jordan, Singa-
pore, Chile, and Peru.50 They currently serve as the model provisions for
environmental and labor concerns with the above countries and therefore
serve a very important role in treaty-making today and in the future.51
Despite the numerous challenges to the NAALC and NAAEC, the fact
of their existence almost remains more important than their outright ef-
fectiveness. Both agreements have furthered cooperation among coun-
tries in preventing negative effects of free trade and provided a pathway
towards improving environmental and labor standards for decades to
come.
50. See Zaretsky, supra note 5.
51. See id.
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